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Abstract
TheMolyneux problem is one of the major questions addressed by early modern authors.
Whereas Locke’s response to Molyneux’s question has been the subject of extensive schol-
arly discussion, Leibniz’s response has received comparatively little attention. This paper
defends an interpretation of Leibniz’s nuanced response to the problem and criticizes a
competing interpretation that has recently been proposed.
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In Book II of An Essay concerning Human Understanding (hereafter: Essay), John Locke con-
siders a question posed to him in the summer of 1688 by William Molyneux, an Irish natural
philosopher and politician. Consider a blind subject who is newly made to see. The subject
has perceived by touch two objects: a sphere and a cube. On the basis of her tactile experi-
ence, the subject can identify the objects.1 Molyneux’s question is: could this subject, when
presented visually with the cube and the sphere, determine with certainty which object is the
cube and which object is the sphere, without touching the objects? Does the subject, in virtue
of her knowing how the cube and the sphere feel, know how the cube and the sphere look?
The case is intended to raise a broader question: what is the relation between the one’s tactile
experience of an object and one’s visual experience of an object? Molyneux and Locke respond
to the problem negatively: the once-blind subject would not be able to identify the objects on
the basis of her visual experience. In his New Essays on Human Understanding (hereafter: New
Essays), Gottfried Leibniz rejects Molyneux and Locke’s answer to the problem. According to
Leibniz, the once-blind subject would be able to determine with certainty on the basis of her
visual experience which object is the sphere and which object is the cube.
Whereas Locke’s response to Molyneux’s question has been the subject of extensive schol-
arly discussion, Leibniz’s response has received comparatively little attention.2 My aim in this
paper is not to defend Leibniz’s response to the Molyneux problem but rather to answer a se-
ries of interpretive questions: why does Leibniz reject Locke and Molyneux’s negative response
to the problem? What features of her tactile experience and visual experience, according to
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Leibniz, enable the once-blind subject to identify the objects presented in her visual experi-
ence? What cognitive resources, according to Leibniz, does the once-blind subject employ in
order to identify the objects? According to the traditional understanding of Leibniz’s response,
Leibniz holds that the once-blind subject would be able to identify the objects by means of her
reasoning about her present visual and past tactile experience of them.3 Moreover, according
to that interpretation, Leibniz’s disagreement with Locke stems from the former’s rationalist
commitment to innatism: the once-blind subject would be able identify the objects by means
of reasoning, according to Leibniz, because she possesses certain innate ideas. While this tradi-
tional interpretation is widely assumed in discussions of Leibniz’s response, it has never received
a full defense. My aim in this paper is to provide a comprehensive and deﬁnitive statement of
the traditional interpretation of Leibniz’s response.
Such a statement is required because the traditional interpretation has recently come under
criticism. Brian Glenney (2012) argues that the traditional interpretation is inferior to another:
the common sense interpretation. According to the common sense interpretation, the faculty of
reasoning plays no signiﬁcant role in Leibniz’s response. Rather, the imagination (or ‘inner
sense’) is the faculty in virtue of which, according to Leibniz, the once-blind subject is able
to identify the cube and the sphere. According to Glenney’s interpretation, Leibniz’s response
to the problem is, in a sense, strikingly empiricist: sense or imagination, not reason, plays the
primary role.4 I will argue that the common sense interpretation lacks textual support.
§1 speciﬁes some features of the version of the problem to which Leibniz responds. §2 dis-
cusses some passages key to Leibniz’s response to the problem. §3 argues against the common
sense interpretation. §4 discusses Leibniz’s theory of ideas. §5 discusses his theory of images.
Drawing on the discussion of Leibniz’s distinction between images and ideas, §6 presents my
interpretation of Leibniz’s response to the Molyneux problem. §7 explains why Leibniz holds
that his aﬃrmative response to the problem requires that certain conditions obtain in the case
of the once-blind subject.
1. What Molyneux Problem?
There are several versions of the Molyneux problem discussed by early modern authors. When
discussing the problem, such authors often leave tacit important assumptions. Before turning
to Leibniz’s response to the problem, we should specify with what version of the Molyneux
problem we will be concerned and what conditions this version of the problem presupposes.
Locke relays Molyneux’s question as follows:
Suppose a Man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish
between a Cube, and a Sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness,
so as to tell, when he felt one and t’other; which is the Cube, which the Sphere.
Suppose then the Cube and Sphere placed on a Table, and the Blind Man to be
made to see. Quaere, Whether by his sight, before he touch’d them, he could now
distinguish, and tell, which is the Globe, which the Cube (E II.9.8).
There is an adult subject who is typical except for her being born blind. While blind, she learned
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to distinguish two objects by means of touch: a cube and a sphere. The cube and the sphere
are roughly of the same size and are composed of the same material. Next, the subject gains
the faculty of visual perception. The subject is then placed some distance in front of a table,
on which rest the sphere and the cube. The subject is asked to identify the objects: the sphere
as the sphere, and the cube as the cube. She must accomplish this task only on the basis of her
visual experience; she is not allowed to touch the objects again.
Leibniz agrees with Locke on most features of the case. Three points of agreement are worth
noting. First, the subject is an adult when she becomes sighted. This allows us to assume that
the once-blind subject is cognitively typical and hence has a normal capacity for reasoning.
Were the subject a child, then a failed identiﬁcation might simply be attributed to her inability
to reason suﬃciently well. If so, there would still be an open question: could a person who
possesses greater intellectual capacities identify the objects on the basis of her visual perception?
Second, in Locke’s negative response to the problem, he states that the subject would not be
able ‘with certainty to say, which was the Globe, which the Cube, whilst he only saw them’ (E
II.9.8, emphasis added).5 We are not interested in whether the subject might be able to guess
which object is which. We want to know whether the subject would be able to identify the
objects with certainty. We want to know whether there is some feature of the subject’s tactile
and visual experience in virtue of the subject knows which object is which. As argued in §7,
this requirement for certain identiﬁcation plays a role in Leibniz’s discussion of a skeptical worry
related to the Molyneux problem.
Third, as James Van Cleve and Gareth Evans have noted, we should add a condition to
the problem (Van Cleve 2013: 220, Evans 1985: 365-366). This condition is not stated by
Molyneux, Locke, or Leibniz, but they each arguably presuppose it.6 Upon her becoming
sighted, the subject, as a matter of fact, might not initially perceive visually objects at all. Her
visual experience might instead be a blooming, buzzing confusion. If so, then the subject
would not be able to identify the objects: her identifying the objects on the basis of her visual
perception requires her being able to perceive visually the objects. Locke and Leibniz each
assume that, when presented with the sphere and the cube, the subject is able to perceive visually
the objects.7
Leibniz’s version of the case appears to diﬀer from Locke’s in at least two important respects.
First, there are at least two ways to understand the problem as presented by Locke. First,
could the once-blind subject see that one object is the sphere and the other object is the cube?
Second, could the once-blind subject reason, on the basis of her present visual experience and
past tactile experience, that one object is the sphere and the other object is the cube?8 One who
is interested in the ﬁrst question requires that the subject’s identiﬁcation of the objects be, using
a distinction drawn by Janet Levine, both epistemically immediate and temporally immediate
(Levine 2006: 6). The identiﬁcation is epistemically immediate just in case it is achieved not
by means of inference or association; it is temporally immediate just in case it is achieved, as it
were, instantaneously. One who is interested in the ﬁrst question requires epistemic immediacy
because she is interested in whether the subject could identify the objects only by means of
her perception of the objects, and not by means of her reasoning about her perception of the
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objects. She requires temporal immediacy because, as Levine notes, temporal immediacy is
plausibly a reliable indicator of epistemic immediacy (Levine 2006: 6). By contrast, one who
is interested in the second question does not require epistemic immediacy. Thus, she also does
not require temporal immediacy: she would allow the subject time to reason about her visual
and tactile experiences. While Locke does not clearly distinguish these two question, Leibniz
is clearly concerned with the second: he requires neither epistemic nor temporal immediacy.
In Leibniz’s version, the subject is given time to reason about her present visual experience of
the objects and her past tactile experience of the objects prior to her attempting to identify the
objects.
Second, Leibniz adds to the case a condition absent from the Locke’s presentation. His
aﬃrmative answer to the problem, he says, requires that this condition obtains (NE 2.9.8;
138). Leibniz stipulates that the subject is told that the bodies presented to her visually are the
sphere and the cube (NE 2.9.8; 136-137).9 The subject knows that the objects she perceives
visually are a sphere and a cube and not, for example, a painting of a sphere and a painting of
a cube. §7 discusses why Leibniz’s aﬃrmative response requires that this condition obtains.
These two diﬀerences between Leibniz’s version of the case and that of Molyneux and Locke
explain, I propose, his prima facie perplexing remark that‘Mr. Molyneux and the author of the
Essay are not as far from my opinion as at ﬁrst appears’ (NE 2.9.8; 136). Context suggests
that Leibniz claims not to diﬀer as much as may ﬁrst appear from Locke because he does not
deny Locke’s answer to the problem insofar as Leibniz’s added conditions are not included the
case. Insofar as his added conditions are omitted, Leibniz does not disagree with Locke. In
this respect, Leibniz’s and Locke’s responses to the problem, as stated, are consistent.10 An
interpretation of Leibniz’s response, then, must be sensitive to the importance Leibniz attaches
to the features peculiar to his version of the case.
2. Key Passages
Leibniz’s response to the Molyneux problem occurs in his commentary on the chapter ‘Of
Perception’ in Book 2 of Locke’s Essay. We should have at hand four key passages from this
discussion.
The ﬁrst key passage is what I will call the Rational Principles Passage:
Rational Principles Passage
…it seems to me past question that the blind man whose sight is restored could
discern them [i.e. the sphere and the cube] by applying rational principles [les
peut discerner par les principes de la raison] to the sensory knowledge which he has
already acquired by touch (NE 2.9.8; 136).
This passage suggests a necessary condition for an adequate interpretation of Leibniz’s response.
Leibniz claims that the once-blind subject could identify the objects by applying ‘rational prin-
ciples.’ The application of rational principles plausibly involves the performance of some act
of reasoning. Thus, an adequate interpretation must ascribe to Leibniz the position that the
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subject identiﬁes the objects in virtue of her performing an act of reasoning. This condition
receives further support from Leibniz’s implying, in a subsequent passage, that his aﬃrmative
response presupposes a subject who is not ‘unaccustomed to making inferences [peu accoutumé
à tirer des consequences]’ (NE 2.9.8; 137).
Call the next key passage the Uniformity Passage:
Uniformity Passage
My view rests on the fact that in the case of the sphere there are no distinguished
points on the surface of the sphere taken in itself, since everything there is uniform
and without angles [tout y étant uni et sans angles], whereas in the case of the cube
there are eight points which are distinguished from all the others (NE 2.9.8; 137).
In this passage, Leibniz claims that his aﬃrmative response to the problem rests on a particular
diﬀerence between the sphere and the cube. The surface of the cube has numerous points
and angles. The surface of the sphere has no points and no angles. The surface of the sphere is
uniform, whereas the surface of the cube is not. An adequate interpretation of Leibniz’s response
should account for this passage: it should explain why Leibniz emphasizes this diﬀerence in
uniformity between the cube and the sphere.
The Uniformity Passage may appear to provide an easy explanation of Leibniz’s response to
the problem. The once-blind subject has perceived, by means of touch, that the cube is not
uniform and the sphere is uniform. Moreover, the subject perceives visually that the cube is not
uniform and the sphere is uniform. Thus, the subject need only match visual uniformity with
tangible uniformity in order to identify the objects. This response begs the question that the
Molyneux problem intends to pose. According to the subject’s tactile experience of the objects,
the sphere is tangibly uniform and the cube is not. According to the subject’s visual experience
of the objects, the sphere is visually uniform and the cube is not. This response presupposes
that there is a correspondence between visible uniformity and tangible uniformity, such that the
once-blind subject would legitimately infer that the object that is tangibly uniform—what she
knows to be the sphere—must be identical with the object that is visually uniform. Whether
there is a correspondence between tangible uniformity and visual uniformity that licenses such
an inference is, in eﬀect, the question the Molyneux problem is intended to raise. Charity
suggests that we ought not attribute to Leibniz this philosophically uninteresting response.
The third key passage is what I’ll call the Geometry Passage:
Geometry Passage
If there were not that way of discerning shapes, a blind man could not learn the
rudiments of geometry by touch, nor could someone else learn them by sight
without touch. However, we ﬁnd that men born blind are capable of learning
geometry, and indeed always have some rudiments of a natural geometry; and we
ﬁnd that geometry is mostly learned by sight alone without employing touch, as
could and indeed must be done by a paralytic or by anyone else to whom touch is
virtually denied (NE 2.9.8; 137).
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In this passage, Leibniz gives an argument for his aﬃrmative response to the problem. The
argument can be stated as follows:
(1) If the once-blind subject could not identify the cube and the sphere, then subjects who
are either blind or paralytic11 cannot learn geometry.
(2) Subjects who are either blind or paralytic can learn geometry.
(3) Therefore, the once-blind subject could identify the cube and the sphere.
This is a puzzling argument. (2) is plausible, but Leibniz gives no justiﬁcation for (1). Why
think that a negative answer to the Molyneux problem entails that subjects with only touch or
only vision are incapable of learning geometry? An adequate interpretation of Leibniz’s response
to the problem should explain why Leibniz, in the Geometry Passage, holds that (1) is true.
The ﬁnal key passage is what I’ll call the Images/Ideas Passage:
Images/Ideas Passage
These two geometries, the blind man’s and the paralytic’s, must come together,
and agree, and indeed ultimately rest on the same ideas [aux mêmes ideés], even
though they have no images in common [ait point d’images communes]. Which
shows yet again how essential it is to distinguish images from exact ideas, which
are composed of deﬁnitions (NE 2.9.8; 137).
Leibniz introduces in this passage a distinction between exact ideas and images. The blind
subject’s geometry and the paralytic’s geometry rest on diﬀerent images but the same ideas.
Leibniz clearly holds that this distinction is at the heart of his response. To understand Leibniz’s
response to theMolyneux problem, we should better understand the distinction. But let us ﬁrst
consider an interpretation that has recently been proposed.
3. The Common Sense Interpretation
In a recent paper, Brian Glenney (2012) has proposed an interpretation of Leibniz’s aﬃrmative
response to the Molyneux problem: the common sense interpretation. The common sense
interpretation takes inspiration from a passage found in Leibniz’s correspondence with Queen
Sophie Charlotte of Prussia:
[S]ince our soul compares the numbers and shapes that are in color, for example,
with the numbers and shapes that are in tactile qualities, there must be an internal
sense in which the perceptions of these diﬀerent external senses are found united.
This is called imagination, which contains both the notions of particular senses,
which are clear but confused, and the notions of the common sense, which are clear
and distinct (AG 187, emphasis original).
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The ‘notions of particular senses’ to which Leibniz refers are sensible images. The ‘notions of
the common sense’ are exact ideas. In this passage, Leibniz claims that both exact ideas and
sensible images are contained in the imagination or ‘common sense.’ According to the com-
mon sense interpretation, Leibniz’s response to the Molyneux problem ought to be understood
in light of this passage. When the once-blind subject has been presented with the cube and
the sphere both by touch and by vision, she has in her mind several salient cognitive items: a
tangible image of each object, a visible image of each object, an exact idea of a cube, and an
exact idea of a sphere. According to the common sense interpretation, upon her possessing all
of these items, the once-blind subject’s imagination ‘perceives’ a ‘commonality’ between, for
example, the cognitive items relating to the cube: the visual image of the cube, the tagible image
of the cube, and the exact idea of a cube (Glenney 2012: 260).12 According to the common
sense interpretation, the imagination’s perceiving the commonality between these items does
not involve rational exertion (Glenney 2012: 261). Moreover, when the imagination perceives
the visual image of the cube and the tangible image of the cube, it disregards the ‘format’ of
these images: it attends only to the content that they have in common, which includes, per
the Uniformity Passage, content as of non-uniformity (Glenney 2012: 260). In virtue of the
once-blind subject’s imagination’s perceiving commonality between these items (and perhaps
the exact idea of the cube), the once-blind subject is able to identify the cube.13
There are at least three reasons to reject the common sense interpretation. First, a problem
concerning the role that Leibniz attributes to the imagination. Apparently, the common sense
interpretation wants to hold that the exact ideas of the cube and the exact idea of the sphere are
each perceived by the imagination.14 To be sure, this is suggested by the passage from the cor-
respondence with Queen Sophie.15 However, there is textual evidence that Leibniz, in theNew
Essays, holds that exact ideas are not objects of the imagination. In his commentary on Locke’s
chapter ‘Of Clear and Obscure Ideas,’ Leibniz associates the imagination with one’s having sen-
sible images (NE 2.29.13; 261-262). Moreover, he claims that ‘knowledge of ﬁgures does not
depend upon the imagination…’ (NE 2.29.13; 261). Context suggests that Leibniz is claiming
here that knowledge of ﬁgures does not depend on the imagination because knowledge of ﬁg-
ures involves exact ideas, which ideas are not objects of the imagination. If Leibniz holds that
exact ideas are not objects of the imagination, then the common sense interpretation renders
mysterious each exact idea’s role in Leibniz’s aﬃrmative response to the Molyneux problem.
Second, as noted above, Leibniz’s discussion of the Molyneux problem occurs in his com-
mentary on Locke’s chapter ‘Of Perception’ in Book 2 of the Essay. Were the common sense
interpretation correct, we would expect Leibniz to mention the faculty of imagination or com-
mon sense in his discussion of the problem. But neither ‘imagination’ nor ‘common sense’
appear in that discussion. The common sense interpretation appears lacking in textual support.
Third, the common sense interpretation holds that the once-blind subject could identify the
objects in virtue of an act of ‘inner sense.’ As Glenney says, the imagination’s discovery of the
common content of, for example, the visual and tangible images of the cube ‘does not invoke
conscious inference, as the imagination is described as a kind of ‘inner sense’ ’ (Glenney 2012:
260). The common sense interpretation denies that the once-blind subject’s accurate identi-
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ﬁcation of the object requires that she perform some act of reasoning. But, as argued above,
Leibniz seems to hold that the once-blind subject would need to perform an act of reasoning in
order to identify the objects. This is suggested both by the Rational Principles Passage and by
Leibniz’s implying that his aﬃrmative response presupposes a subject who is not ‘unaccustomed
to making inferences’ (NE 2.9.8; 137).16 In this respect, the common sense interpretation is
inconsistent with textual evidence.
4. Exact Ideas
§3 raised three objections to Glenney’s common sense interpretation of Leibniz’s response. That
interpretation appears textually inadequate. In what follows, I develop a diﬀerent interpreta-
tion, one which, unlike the common sense interpretation, attributes a central role to reasoning
in Leibniz’s response. This interpretation requires a fuller understanding of what Leibniz means
by ‘exact idea’ and ‘image.’
The extension of Leibniz’s term ‘exact idea’ (or, equivalently, ‘intellectual idea’) is wide. All
ideas of arithmetic and geometry are exact ideas. Leibniz counts among exact geometrical ideas
the ideas of geometrical ﬁgures (NE 2.29.13; 261-262). Thus, crucially for our purposes, the
idea of a sphere and the idea of a cube are exact ideas. In addition, the ideas of ‘being, one,
[and] same’ are also exact ideas (NE 4.4.5; 392, emphasis removed). So too are the ideas of
‘Substance, Duration, Change, Action, Perception, [and] Pleasure’ (NE Preface; 51). Indeed,
there is some suggestion that all ideas ‘from which necessary truths arise’ are exact ideas (NE
1.1.15; 81).17 But what do these ideas have in common, such that they each qualify as an exact
idea?
We should ﬁrst answer another, more basic question: what, according to Leibniz, is an idea?
Locke deﬁnes ideas as ‘whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks’ (E
1.1.8). Leibniz agrees with this deﬁnition to the extent that he holds that ideas are in the minds
of human subjects, but disagrees with the implication that all objects of human cognition are
ideas (L 207).18 In the essay What is an Idea? (1677) Leibniz identiﬁes several ‘things in our
mind’ that are distinct from ideas: ‘thoughts, perceptions, and aﬀections’ (L 207).
While Leibniz denies one Lockean view with respect to ideas, he appears to accept another:
that ideas are cognitive items. Ideas are not thoughts, but rather are the things about which we
think. He states in the New Essays:
If the idea were the form of the thought, it would come into and go out of existence
with the actual thoughts which correspond to it, but since it is the object of thought
it can exist before and after the thoughts (NE 2.1.1; 109).
Also in the New Essays:
If ideas were only the forms or manners of thoughts, they would cease with them;
but you yourself have acknowledged, sir, that they are the inner objects of thoughts,
and as such they can persist (NE 2.10.2; 140).19
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While Leibniz holds that ideas ought not be identiﬁed with (token) thoughts, he nonethe-
less appears to accept, in these and other passages, that ideas are cognitive items or ‘objects of
thought.’
This interpretation is not uncontroversial. According to Nicholas Jolley, Leibnizian ideas
are not cognitive items, but rather dispositions to have certain thoughts (Jolley 1990: 136-137,
Jolley 2005: 104).20 According to this interpretation, one’s idea of a cube is identical with
one’s disposition to have thoughts of a cube. While there are passages that seem to support
the dispositionalist interpretation, the interpretation doesn’t sit well with several claims Leibniz
makes with respect to ideas.21 First, Jolley’s interpretation is in tension with Leibniz’s ascribing
certain properties to ideas. In the New Essays and elsewhere, Leibniz claims that each idea has
a degree of clarity and distinctness.22 We will discuss these notions in more detail below. For
now, it suﬃces to say that Leibniz clearly means to ascribe the properties of clarity and distinct-
ness to ideas themselves (NE 2.29.2-4; 254-255). It is diﬃcult to make sense of a disposition’s
having the properties of clarity and distinctness: prima facie, a disposition doesn’t have any
content that might be more or less clear and more or less distinct. Second, Leibniz holds that
at least some ideas are ‘composed of deﬁnitions’ (NE 2.31.2; 266-267, Ideas/Images Passage).
Jolley’s interpretation renders this claim unintelligible: how could a disposition be composed of
deﬁnitions? This brief discussion is insuﬃcient to rule-out an interpretation on which Leibniz
sometimes identiﬁes ideas with dispositions. However, it does suggest that it is implausible that
Leibnizian ideas are only dispositions. The interpretation of Leibniz’s response to the Molyneux
problem presented in what follows treats Leibnizean ideas as cognitive items, which items are
available to reﬂective attention.23
Leibniz’s notion of an idea should be distinguished from another, closely related notion:
that of a concept.24 In the New Essays, Leibniz sometimes treats these as equivalent. But there
is a diﬀerence. In the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686), Leibniz says that that concepts are ideas
that we ‘conceive or form’ (AG 59). Thus, while all concepts are ideas, not all ideas are con-
cepts: only ideas that one has actually cognized qualify as concepts. As this suggests, Leibniz
holds that there are ideas that one can be said to have despite one’s never having conceived those
ideas. In what follows, when I speak of ‘ideas’ (either exact or not), I refer to ideas that have
already been conceived by the subject who possesses them, unless otherwise noted.25
Leibniz does not state explicitly the features that distinguish exact ideas from mere ideas.26
But he does suggest three features that exact ideas have in common: they are distinct, clear, and
innate.27
In the New Essays, Leibniz tells us that he ‘always follow[s] M. Descartes’ language’ with
respect to the notion of distinctness (NE 2.29.4; 255). Descartes deﬁnes a distinct idea (or
‘perception’) as one that ‘is so sharply separated from all other perceptions that it contains in
itself only what is clear’ (CSM I: 208).28 Descartes’ suggestion is that an idea’s distinctness is
a matter both of its being ‘sharply separated’ from other ideas and of its having content that
is, in Stephen Nadler’s terms, ‘well deﬁned and delineated’ (Nadler 2006: 98). One’s idea of
a cube is distinct if one can distinguish this idea from other ideas and if this idea has content
that is suﬃciently intelligible.
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Leibniz emphasizes the second aspect of Descartes’ account of distinctness. For Leibniz, an
idea is distinct only if one can ‘distinguish [its] contents’ (NE 2.29.4; 255). Consider an idea
of a heap of stones. According to Leibniz, in order for the idea of a heap of stones to be distinct,
one must grasp ‘how many stones there are and some other properties of the heap’ (NE 2.29.8;
258). Likewise, a necessary condition for one’s idea of a chiliagon’s being distinct is that one
know the number of sides the ﬁgure has (NE 2.29.8; 258).29 In order for an idea to be distinct,
one must know the content of the idea and that content must be orderly. Distinctness is a
gradable notion: content can be more or less well known and more or less orderly (NE 2.1.1;
113, Simmons 2001: 57). Leibniz maintains that exact ideas are entirely distinct.
Leibniz’s claim that exact ideas are entirely distinct is related to his view that such ideas are
composed of deﬁnitions. Distinct ideas are ideas that contain the deﬁnition of their object (NE
2.31.2; 266). The exact idea of a cube is distinct insofar as it gives the deﬁnition of a cube. Def-
initions, according to Leibniz, are ‘nothing but a distinct setting out of ideas’ (NE 1.2.25-27;
101).30 The deﬁnition of which the exact idea of a cube is composed just is the content of the
exact idea set out in an orderly way, and this deﬁnition gives necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for an object’s being a cube (NE 2.31.2; 266).31 Thus, an exact idea’s distinctness and its being
composed of deﬁnitions are closely related: an exact idea’s distinctness consists, in part, in its
having orderly content, and a deﬁnition is the content of an idea set out in an orderly way.
Leibniz claims that ‘distinct ideas distinguish one object from another’ (NE 2.29.4; 255).
One’s idea of the cube is entirely distinct and thus is composed of deﬁnitions. Such deﬁnitions
provide the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for an object’s being a cube. Thus, in virtue of
one’s possessing the idea of a cube, one is able to apply these necessary and suﬃcient conditions
to an object in order to determine whether an object is a cube. Because one’s exact idea of a cube
is entirely distinct, one’s possessing the idea enables one to distinguish cubes from non-cubes.
In addition to their being entirely distinct, exact ideas are entirely clear. In the New Essays,
Leibniz says:
I say, then, that an idea is clear when it enables one to recognize the thing and
distinguish it from other things. For example, when I have a really clear idea of a
colour I shall not accept some other colour in place of it; and if I have a clear idea
of a plant, I shall pick it out from others which are close to it — if I cannot, the
idea is obscure (NE 2.29.2; 254-255).
According to this understanding of clarity, one’s idea of a cube is clear if one can distinguish
cubes from non-cubes. If one’s possessing the idea of a cube did not enable one to distinguish
cubes from non-cubes, then one’s idea of a cube would be obscure. This understanding of
clarity is, Leibniz tells us, the same as that which he gives in the Meditations on Knowledge,
Truth, and Ideas. In that essay, Leibniz says that ‘knowledge is clear when I have the means for
recognizing the thing represented’ (AG 24).32 Like distinctness, Leibniz takes clarity to be a
gradable notion. As I will argue below, Leibniz’s aﬃrmative response to the Molyneux problem
turns on those exact ideas’ being perfectly distinct and does not appeal to the clarity of those
ideas. So we need not consider the details of Leibniz’s account of clarity, or in what respect this
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notion diﬀers from the notion of distinctness.
The third property that all exact ideas share, according to Leibniz, is that they are innate.
All exact ideas ‘come from [the mind’s] own depths’ and hence do not have their source in the
senses (NE 1.1.1; 74). For example, he says approvingly:
On this view [i.e. the view that all ‘pure ideas’33 are innate], the whole of arithmetic
and of geometry should be regarded as innate, and contained within us in an
implicit way, so that we can ﬁnd them within ourselves by attending carefully and
methodically to what is already in ourminds, without employing any truth learned
through experience or through being handed on by other people (NE 1.1.5; 77).
And later in the New Essays:
[O]ur certainty regarding universal and eternal truths is grounded in the ideas
themselves, independently of the senses, just as pure ideas, ideas of the intellect
— e.g. those of being, one, same etc. — are also independent of the senses (NE
4.4.5; 392, emphasis original).
The second passage indicates one of Leibniz’s central motivations for his holding that exact ideas
are innate. Ideas of geometry, for example, are exact ideas. If exact ideas were adventitious,34
then ideas of geometry would be adventitious. But only truths ‘grounded in’ innate ideas are
necessary truths.35 If ideas of geometry were adventitious, then geometrical truths would be
merely contingent. Since geometrical truths are paradigmatic instances of necessary truth, ideas
of geometry must be innate. Leibniz infers that all exact ideas are innate.36
While Leibniz holds that exact ideas are innate, he denies that every exact idea is imme-
diately available to every subject who possesses it. At least some exact ideas are available to a
subject only upon her ‘attending carefully and methodically to what is already in [her mind]’
(NE 1.1.5; 77). Such ideas can be conceived only in virtue of ‘the mind’s reﬂection when it
turns in on itself ’ (NE 1.1.11; 81). As Julia Borcherding explains, Leibniz does not seem to
view reﬂection, as Locke does, as mere introspection, but rather as ‘the starting point of a more
complex reasoning process’ (Borcherding 2018: 48). Reﬂection, for Leibniz, is an active, intel-
lectually sophisticated process whereby one can acquire new concepts and knowledge.37 Leibniz
maintains that one genuinely possesses exact ideas that one has not yet accessed by means of
reﬂective attention. Such ideas are like veins in a block of marble, which ‘outline a shape which
is in the marble before they are uncovered by the sculptor’ (NE 1.1.23; 86).
Of principal interest, for present purposes, are exact ideas of geometry: in particular, the
exact ideas of geometric ﬁgures. Leibniz clearly holds that we possess such ideas (NE 2.31.2;
267). But he is less clear with respect to the content of those ideas. As I will argue, Leibniz’s
response to the Molyneux problem seems to require only that the exact idea of a sphere and
exact ideas of cube, respectively, have content as of uniformity and non-uniformity. But he
seems to hold that these ideas include in their content all of the geometric properties of their
respective ﬁgures. This is suggested by his claim that the ‘whole […] of geometry should be
regarded as innate’ (NE 1.1.5; 77).
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5. Images
Recall that Leibniz, in the Ideas/Images Passage, distinguishes between ideas and images. What,
according to Leibniz, are images? ‘Image,’ in the the sense salient here, is a technical term used
occasionally by Leibniz prior to the New Essays.38 In the New Essays, by contrast, it is used
frequently. Indeed, Leibniz apparently uses a variety of terms to refer to images: ‘images’ (NE
2.9.8; 137), ‘images of sense’ (NE 1.1.5; 77), ‘sensory images’ (NE 4.6.7; 404), ‘sensations’
(NE 2.19.1; 161), ‘impressions’ (NE 4.17.13; 487), ‘ideas of sensible qualities’ (NE 4.4.5;
392), and even the scholastic ‘species’ (NE 2.11.17; 144).
Like exact ideas, images are cognitive items. Unlike exact ideas, images are adventitious:
they have their source in the perceptual experience (NE Preface; 53, 2.9.8; 135).39 Indeed,
Leibniz appears to hold that images are constitutive of perceptual experience: when one per-
ceives visually a cube, one has an image of a cube. For example, Leibniz says that when we per-
ceive visually a painting, we do not ‘immediately see the thing that causes the image.’ Rather,
Leibniz holds that ‘strictly we see only the image, and are aﬀected only by rays of light’ (NE
2.9.8; 135).40 Images do not, however, occur only in perceptual experience: they are also
present to us in dreams and in memory (NE 2.21.12; 177).
Leibniz holds that images, unlike exact ideas, are not entirely distinct. But does he hold that
they are entirely confused? Brian Glenney reads Leibniz as holding that images ‘have no con-
tent available to consciousness’ (Glenney 2012: 255). Glenney apparently holds that images
are entirely indistinct. There is textual evidence to suggest that Leibnizean images are entirely
confused, and thus lack any distinguishable content. Leibniz claims:
[A]n idea can be at once clear and confused, as are the ideas of sensible qualities
which are associated with particular organs, e.g. the ideas of colour and of warmth.
They are clear, because we recognize them and easily tell them from one another;
but they are not distinct, because we cannot distinguish their contents (NE 2.29.1;
255)
He also claims that the ‘clear image’ of a ten-sided ﬁgure consists ‘merely in a confused idea’ and
does not ‘reveal the nature and properties of the ﬁgure’ (NE 2.29.13; 262, emphasis original).
However, while Leibniz does sometimes speak dismissively of the content of sensory images,
there are several passages in which he indicates that he takes the content of images to be at least
somewhat distinct. He claims that ‘we have very distinct ideas of the solid, visible parts of the
human body…’ (NE 2.29.13; 261, emphasis added). The reference to visible parts of the body
indicates that Leibniz is referring here to visible images with the term ‘idea.’ Further, Leibniz
claims that while the geometrical truths proofs do not depend on ‘the testimony of the senses,’
these truths are ‘[made] evident’ by ‘sense-images’ (NE Preface; 50). If the images of geomet-
rical ﬁgures were entirely confused, such images could not attest to the truth of the claims of
Euclidean geometry. And in On Freedom (1689),41 Leibniz speaks of our perceiving a thing
‘suﬃciently distinctly through the senses’ (AG 96).
What to make of the apparently contradictory textual evidence? A distinction between
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conceptual distinctness and perceptual distinctness helps make sense of it (Jorgensen 2019: 121-
122).42 These forms of distinctness are not necessarily diﬀerent kinds of distinctness, but rather
diﬀerent standards that lie on the same spectrum.43 Conceptual distinctness is higher-grade
distinctness: an item that is conceptually distinct is more distinct than an item that is merely
perceptually distinct. Exact ideas are conceptually distinct; sensible images are merely percep-
tually distinct. An analogy, due to Larry Jorgensen, helps to clarify (Jorgensen 2015: 58).
Consider: all math tests have some degree all of diﬃculty, but not all math tests are diﬃcult.
Likewise, all images have some degree of distinctness. This is why Leibniz often indicates that
images are distinct to at least some extent. However, images are not distinct, insofar as they
never approximate the distinctness of exact ideas: conceptual distinctness. Sensory images,
that is, are distinct (perceptually distinct) without being distinct (conceptually distinct). Thus,
when one has a visual image of a cube, this image has some distinguishable content: it has some
content as of the geometrical properties of the cube. However, this content does not approxi-
mate the distinctness of one’s exact idea of a cube.
Before turning to Leibniz’s response, we should consider the relationship between ideas and
images. The Ideas/Images passage perhaps suggests a sharp distinction between ideas and im-
ages. But Leibniz sometimes indicates that images are ideas: ‘image,’ he sometimes suggests,
is a species of the genus ‘idea.’ He tells us that a ‘clear image…consist[s] in merely a confused
idea’ (NE 2.29.13; 262, emphasis removed). He also talks about ‘ideas of sensible qualities’
when he clearly has images in mind (NE 4.3.6; 375, 4.4.5; 392). And, when discussing im-
ages of straight lines, he says: ‘images of this sort are merely confused ideas’ (NE 4.7.6; 451).
However, there is also substantial textual evidence to suggest that images, according to Leibniz,
are not ideas. He rebukes Locke for ‘confound[ing]’ images with ideas (NE 2.29.13; 261). He
goes on to discuss the ‘mistake of taking the image for the idea’ (NE 2.29.16; 263, emphasis
removed).44 And, while discussing the ‘sensory images’ of colors and tastes, he says in a paren-
thetical remark: ‘…the truth is that these ought to be called ‘images’ rather than ‘qualities’ or
even ‘ideas’ (NE 4.6.7; 404).
Shane Duarte (2009) suggests a way of making sense of this: ‘idea,’ at least in the New
Essays, is ambiguous. Sometimes, Leibniz uses it to refer to any cognitive item whatsoever.
This usage of ‘idea’ mirrors Locke’s, for whom all cognitive contents are ideas. Other times,
Leibniz uses ‘idea’ to refer only to what he calls, in his response to the Molyneux problem, an
‘exact idea.’ On the former meaning of ‘idea,’ images are ideas; on the latter meaning, they
are not. Leibniz’s use of ‘idea,’ in the New Essays, does seem ambiguous. But, I suggest, this
ambiguity is the result neither of carelessness nor of mere imitation of Locke, but rather reﬂects
Leibniz’s view with respect to the relationship between these two categories. Images and exact
ideas diﬀer in source and degree of distinctness. But Leibniz does not understand these items
to be of a fundamentally diﬀerent kind.45 Images are not ideas in the sense that they are not
exact ideas: they do not possess the requisite degree of distinctness. But this, I suggest, does
not preclude images’ and exact ideas’ being species of the same genus: namely, the genus ‘idea.’
Leibniz often refers to images as ideas because images are ideas: because he recognizes no ul-
timate distinction in kind between exact ideas and images. On this proposal, exact ideas and
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images occupy diﬀerent positions along the same spectrum.4647
6. Leibniz’s Response to the Problem
6.1. The Response Explained
§4 and §5 provided an account of Leibniz’s distinction between ideas and images. Drawing on
this account, we can distinguish three stages of Molyeneux’s case.
Stage 1: The subject is born with a functioning sense of touch but without a functioning
sense of vision. She innately has both an exact idea of a cube (eic) and an exact idea of a
sphere (eis). These ideas, respectively, have content as of the geometric properties of cubes and
the geometric properties of spheres. Included in such content is the fact that spheres are are
uniform (i.e. have no points and no angles) and cubes are not uniform. Thus, eis and eic,
respectively, have content as of uniformity-in-general and non-uniformity-in-general.
Stage 2: As an adult, the subject is presented with the sphere and the cube. She has tangible
images of the sphere (tis) and the cube (tic). tis has content as of tangible uniformity, and tic
has content as of tangible non-uniformity.48 She learns that the object that is tangibly uniform
is called ‘the sphere’ and that the object that is not tangibly uniform is called ‘the cube.’ The
subject does not yet have visual images of the sphere and the cube.
Stage 3: The subject gains the sense of vision. She is presented visually with the sphere and
the cube, but is not allowed to touch them again. She now has visual images of the sphere (vis)
and the cube (vic). vis has content as of visual uniformity, and vic has content as of visual
non-uniformity. Upon her having these images, the subject is asked to say which object that
she now perceives visually is the cube and which is the sphere. She is assured that the things
she perceives visually are the objects she touched: one of her visual images is an image of the
cube and the other is an image of the sphere.
Recall that the Rational Principles Passage indicates that Leibniz holds that the subject could
identify the objects in virtue of her performing an act of reasoning. Leibniz holds that the
subject could, at stage 3, perform the line of reasoning, such that she could successfully identify
the objects. Unfortunately, Leibniz does not tell us, exactly, the line of reasoning he thinks the
once-blind subject would perform. Nonetheless, drawing from the preceding discussion, we
can construct an argument to whose premises, according to Leibniz, the once-blind subject is
entitled:49
(1) tic has content as of tangible non-uniformity such that it corresponds50 to the content
of eic.
(2) vis has content as of visual uniformity such that it does not correspond to the content
of eic.
(3) vis and tic are not images of the same object. [1, 2]
(4) Either vis is an image of the same object of which tic is an image or vic is an image
of the same object of which tic is an image.
(5) vic is an image of the same object of which tic is an image.51 [3, 4]
(6) tic is an image of the cube.
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(7) vic is an image of the cube. [5, 6]
(8) If vic is an image of the cube, then vis is an image of the sphere.
(9) vis is an image of the sphere. [7, 8]
(10) vic is an image of the cube and vis is an image of the sphere.[7, 9]
As a sensible image, tic has content that is at least somewhat distinct. Included in the content
of tic is the property of (tangible) non-uniformity. This property is also included in the content
of eic. As an exact idea of a cube, eic contains content as of all of the geometric properties of
cubes. Thus, (1): tic has content such that it corresponds to eic. vis is also a sensible image,
and so also has content that is at least somewhat distinct. Included in the content of vis is the
property of (visual) uniformity. This property is not included in the content of eic: eic has
content that reﬂects the fact that cubes are essentially non-uniform. Thus, (2): vis has content
that does not correspond to the content of eic. vis and tic do not correspond to the same exact
idea. Thus, the once-blind subject can infer that they cannot be images of the same geometric
ﬁgure. That is, the once-blind subject can infer (3) from (1) and (2).
The once-blind subject is entitled to premise (4) in virtue of a condition Leibniz adds to
the case. Recall that Leibniz stipulates that the subject is told that the objects she sees upon her
gaining the faculty of visual perception are the same objects that she touched previously. Thus,
the subject knows that one of the two visual images that she has in stage 3 of the case, vic and
vis, is an image of the cube. Thus, she knows (4): either vis is an image of the object of which
tic is an image or vic is an image of the object of which tic is an image. Given (3) and (4), the
subject can infer (5): vic and tic are images of the same object. The subject is entitled to (6)
because, at stage 2, she knows that tic is an image of the object that is called ‘the cube.’ From
(5) and (6), the subject can infer (7): vic is an image of the cube.
The subject knows (8) because of Leibniz’s added condition: she has been told that one of
vis and vic is an image of the cube and the other is an image of the sphere. Thus, because, by
(7), the subject knows that vic is an image of the cube, the subject knows (9): vis is an image
of the sphere. From (7) and (9), (10) follows: vic is an image of the cube and vis is an image of
the sphere. Because she knows (10), the subject can straightforwardly identify the sphere as the
sphere and the cube as the cube. By means of this chain of reasoning, the subject can identify
the objects.
6.2. Remaining Questions
The above discussion raises at least four questions. First, as Robert Hopkins notes, one central
question raised by the Molyneux problem is: is there some property represented by both touch
and vision? (Hopkins 441: 2005). What is Leibniz’s answer to this question? Apparently, ‘yes’:
tis and vis, for example, each include content as of the property of uniformity. But Leibniz’s
aﬃrmative response to the problem does not depend, I suggest, on uniformity as presented
tangibly in tis’s being recognizably the same as (or even similar to) uniformity as presented
visually in vis. According to the present interpretation, Leibniz’s aﬃrmative response does not
require that there be a correspondence between visual uniformity and tangible uniformity. His
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response requires only that vis—which has content as of visual uniformity—and tis—which
has content as of tangible uniformity—correspond to the same exact idea. Leibniz’s response
requires only indirect correspondence between visual uniformity as presented in vis and tan-
gible uniformity as presented in tis: correspondence mediated by eis.52 Thus, Leibniz need
not answer the question of whether there is direct correspondence between visual uniformity
and tangible uniformity in order to respond to the problem aﬃrmatively.53 He need not posit
any recognizable similarity between, for example, tis and vis. This is a peculiarity of Leibniz’s
response, but not necessarily a problematic one. Indeed, it seems a feature of Leibniz’s response
that it does not require his taking a stand on this controversial—and perhaps interminable—
issue.
Second, the above discussion has focused on what Leibniz calls ‘perception’: the mind’s hav-
ing internal representations of external things (AG 208). But Leibniz also holds that human
minds have the capacity for what he calls ‘apperception’: the reﬂective knowledge or conscious-
ness of such internal representations (AG 208).54 What role, if any, does apperception play in
Leibniz’s response? As shown in §6.1, Leibniz holds that the once-blind subject would be able
to reason her way to identifying the objects with which she is presented visually in virtue of
her attending to content of the images and exact ideas. While Leibniz does not say as much,
it is natural to think that this would involve the subject’s apperceiving those representations,
thereby becoming conscious of their content. Thus, it seems that apperception plays a crucial
(albeit tacit) role in Leibniz’s response.
Third, what role does reﬂection, in Leibniz’s view, play in the once-blind subject’s identi-
ﬁcation of the objects? Recall that while Leibniz holds that exact ideas are innate, he denies
that they are immediately available to every subject who possesses them. At least some, if not
all, exact ideas must be ‘uncovered’ by means of reﬂection. Thus, Leibniz’s response tacitly
presupposes another condition: that the once-blind subject has performed the requisite acts of
reﬂection such that she is able to attend to the content of eic and eis. Leibniz’s response pre-
supposes, then, a rather sophisticated subject, one who has reﬂected on geometry to suﬃcient
degree. Further, recall that Leibnizian reﬂection seems to involve an element of ratiocination.
Thus, reasoning is involved in Leibniz’s response at two points: it is required for eic and eis’s
being available to the once-blind subject, and the subject must reason about the contents of
those exact ideas in order to identify the objects.
Fourth, according to the present interpretation, Leibniz’s response requires that the once-
blind subject compare cognitive items received by the senses (images) with items that are not
(ideas). His response requires that the once-blind subject compare experiential content with the
content of innate ideas. How is such contact between these contents possible? This question
demands a fuller treatment, one which for which there is not space here. But recall the above
suggestion that, according to Leibniz, sensory images and exact ideas do not diﬀer in funda-
mental kind: they are both, for Leibniz, species of the genus ‘idea,’ ultimately diﬀering just in
degree of distinctness. If that suggestion is correct, then there seems not obvious diﬃculty with
respect to one’s comparing the contents of perceptions of each kind.
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6.3. Criteria of Adequacy
§2 considered four passages from Leibniz’s discussion of the Molyneux problem. An adequate
interpretation of Leibniz response to the problem ought to account for each of these passages.
Let’s now consider whether the present interpretation meets this desideratum.
First, the Rational Principles Passage. Recall that, in that passage, Leibniz suggests that the
once-blind subject would be able to identify the objects she perceives visually in virtue of her
performing some act of reasoning. A subject ‘unaccustomed to making inferences,’ he implies,
would be unable to identify the objects (NE 2.9.8; 137). According to the present interpreta-
tion, the once-blind subject must complete the chain of reasoning expressed by premises (1)-(9)
above. Thus, the present interpretation accounts for the Rational Principles Passage.
Second, the Uniformity Passage. Recall that, in that passage, Leibniz suggests that his af-
ﬁrmative response to Molyneux’s question draws on a particular diﬀerence between the cube
and the sphere: the cube is not uniform (i.e. has numerous points and angles) and the sphere
is uniform. According to the present interpretation, this diﬀerence between the sphere and the
cube (and the images/ideas thereof ) enables the once-blind subject to determine that her visual
image of the sphere and her tangible image of the cube are not images of the same object. In
other words, premises (1)-(3) of the above chain of reasoning turn on the cube and the sphere’s
diﬀering with respect to uniformity. Thus, the present interpretation accounts for the Unifor-
mity Passage.
Third, the Geometry Passage. Recall that, in that passage, Leibniz gives the following ar-
gument:
(1) If the once-blind subject could not identify the cube and the sphere, then subjects who
are either blind or paralytic cannot learn geometry.
(2) Subjects who are either blind or paralytic can learn geometry.
(3) Therefore, the once-blind subject could identify the cube and the sphere.
We can now understand why Leibniz holds (1). (1) can be seen as following, by transitivity of
entailment, from three conditional claims to which Leibniz is committed:
(1′) If the once-blind subject could not identify the cube and the sphere, then the subject
does not possess exact ideas of the cube and the sphere.
(1′′) If the once-blind subject does not possess exact ideas of the cube and the sphere, then
the subject cannot learn geometry.
(1′′′) If the once-blind subject cannot learn geometry, then subjects who are either blind or
paralytic cannot learn geometry.
(1) Therefore, if the once-blind subject could not identify the cube and the sphere, then
subjects who are either blind or paralytic cannot learn geometry.
Leibniz holds that, at stage 3 of Molyneux’s case, under normal conditions, if the once-blind
subject possesses exact ideas of the cube and the sphere, then the subject could identify the
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cube and the sphere.55 (1′) is the contraposition of this conditional. With respect to (1′′),
Leibniz holds that geometric truths are necessary truths. Moreover, necessary truths are known
only on the basis of innate ideas; the senses can only provide us knowledge of contingent truths.
In order to have knowledge of geometric truths, one must have innate ideas of geometry. Innate
ideas of geometry are exact ideas. Thus, one must have exact ideas of geometry in order to have
knowledge of geometric truths. Leibniz would accept that if one has exact ideas of geometry,
then one has exact ideas of a cube and a sphere (NE 1.1.5; 77).56 Thus, if one does not possess
exact ideas of the cube and the sphere, then one cannot have knowledge of geometric truths.
And if one cannot have knowledge of geometric truths, then one cannot learn geometry. Thus,
(1′′): if one does not possess exact ideas of the cube and the sphere, then one cannot learn
geometry. Leibniz does not endorse explicitly (1′′′). But it appears uncontroversial. From (1′),
(1′′), and (1′′′), (1) follows.
Fourth, the Ideas/Images Passage. This passage suggests that Leibniz’s distinction between
exact ideas and images is central to his aﬃrmative response to the Molyneux problem. As
suggested by this passage, the present interpretation holds that Leibniz’s response to the problem
depends on the once-blind subject’s having certain innate ideas and certain images.
7. An Added Condition
As discussed above, Leibniz adds a condition to Molyneux’s case that is absent from Locke’s
presentation. The condition Leibniz adds to Molyneux’s case is: the subject is told that the
objects of which vic and vis are images of the cube and the sphere:
I reply that he will know which is which if he is told that, of the two appearances
or perceptions he has of them, one belongs to the sphere and the other to the cube.
But if he is not thus instructed in advance, I grant that it will not at once occur to
him that these paintings of them (as it were) that he forms at the back of his eyes,
which could come from a ﬂat painting on the table, represent bodies (NE 2.9.8;
138).
If this condition does not obtain, then the once-blind subject would not (as least immediately)
be able to identify the objects. Why is this so? We have already seen one answer to this ques-
tion. As discussed in §6, this condition is required by the line of reasoning that the once-blind
subject would perform in order to identify the cube and the sphere. Recall premise (4) of the
once-blind subject’s chain of reasoning: either vis is an image of the same object of which tic
is an image or vic is an image of the same object of which tic is an image. Because, in Leibniz’s
version of the case, the once-blind subject has been told that the objects of which she has visible
images are the sphere and the cube, and because she knows that tic is an image of one of those
objects (the cube), the subject knows that either vic or vis is an image of the object of which
tic is an image.57
As the above passage indicates, there is another reason for Leibniz’s added condition. Leib-
niz is plausibly worried about the following alternative version of Molyneux’s case. Let stage
1 and stage 2 of the case be the same. In stage 3, let the once-blind subject be presented with
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mere paintings of the cube and the sphere. The once-blind subject has visual images of a sphere
painting and cube painting: visp and vicp. Leibniz holds that visp and vis would have similar
content, and vicp and vic would also have similar content. Leibniz therefore worries that the
once-blind subject could perform a line of reasoning similar to that given above using vicp and
visp instead of vic and vis. The conclusion of this alternative line of reasoning would be that
vicp is an image of the cube and visp is an image of the sphere. This conclusion would be false:
vicp and visp are not images of bodies at all. Recall that the Molyneux problem, as presented
by Locke, is concerned with whether the once-blind subject could identify and with certainty
the cube and the sphere. This alternative case threatens the certainty of the once-blind subject’s
identiﬁcation of the objects.58 Leibniz’s added condition is intended to rule out this alternative
case.
Leibniz holds that it is not strictly necessary for his aﬃrmative answer to the problem that
his added condition obtain. He holds that the once-blind subject could, at least in principle,
determine that vis and vic are images of bodies and not paintings
…through applying principles of optics to the light rays, to understand from the
evidence of the lights and shadows that there is something blocking the rays and
that it must be precisely the same thing that resists his touch (NE 2.9.8; 138).
Leibniz suggests that the subject could, by applying ‘principles of optics’ to the rays of light
coming from behind the sphere and the cube, that the things in her visual ﬁeld are the sphere
and the cube and not mere paintings of the sphere and the cube. He mentions that the subject
would be able to do this when ‘the source of the light falling on them is moved or the position
of [her] eyes changes’ (NE 2.9.8; 138).59
8. Conclusion
Locke’s Essay begins with a polemic. The target of this polemic is the view that there exist in
the mind innate principles and ideas. Book 1 of the Essay consists in a battery of arguments the
aim of which is to demonstrate that there are no innate principles, and hence that there are no
innate ideas. According to the interpretation of defended here, Leibniz’s aﬃrmative response
rests primarily on two claims. The ﬁrst is that there is a distinction between sensible images
and exact ideas. The second is that cognitive items of the latter sort do not have their source in
experience, but rather come from the mind’s ‘own depths’ (NE 1.1.1; 75). The present inter-
pretation thus allows us to see that source of the Leibniz’s optimism with respect to Molyneux’s
question is not, ﬁrst and foremost, a disagreement with Locke about the nature of perceptual
experience. Rather, his optimism rests on his disagreeing with Locke about our initial cognitive
state. For Locke, the mind prior to experience is but a dark room. For Leibniz, it is teeming
with metaphysical and mathematical truths. Leibniz’s commitment to the latter view, coupled
with his optimism that the once-blind subject has the inferential capacity to perform the chain
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Notes
1I use ‘identify’ as a success term throughout this paper.
2For discussion of Locke’s response, see Brandt-Bolton 1994 and Bruno and Mandelbaum 2010. As far as I
am aware, Glenney 2012 is the only sustained treatment of Leibniz’s response.
3Gareth Evans and James Van Cleve each accept the traditional interpretation. However, neither Evans nor
Van Cleve oﬀer a full-scale presentation of this interpretation, nor do they situate, as I do, Leibniz’s response within
his broader theory of mind. See Evans 1985: 364-399, Van Cleve 2015: 220-222.
4Of course, both canonical ‘empiricists’ who address the problem (Locke and George Berkeley) respond nega-
tively to the problem. Thus, even on Glenney’s interpretation, Leibniz’s response diﬀers signiﬁcantly from Locke’s
and Berkeley’s.
5I take Locke to be using ‘certainty’ to mean ‘with a very high degree of credence and justiﬁcation.’ I use
‘certainty’ in this sense throughout the paper.
6Denis Diderot appears to notice this assumption in his Letter on the Blind. See Diderot 1916: 120-121.
Leibniz may also notice this assumption. In his discussion of the problem, he says: ‘I am not talking about what
[the once-blind subject] might actually do on the spot, when he is dazzled and confused by the strangeness…’ See
NE 2.9.8; 137. References to the New Essays use the following format. In ‘NE 2.9.8; 137,’ ‘2.9.8’ refers to Book
2, Chapter 9, Section 8 and ‘137’ refers to the corresponding page number of the Akademie edition, which gives
the original French text.
7There is a related question of whether the once-blind subject, upon gaining the ability to perceive visually,
would be able to perceive distance visually. George Berkeley, for example, in his New Theory of Vision, denies
that she would (Berkeley 2008). Leibniz does not address this question. For the purposes of this paper, we will
assume that the once-blind subject can perceive visually objects at a distance upon gaining the capacity for visual
perception.
8Of course, one might hold that sense perception is a mere species of reasoning, and so reject this distinction.
For the purposes of this paper, I set this issue aside.
9Leibniz seems to hold that the objects with which the subject is presented visually are the numerically same
objects that she previously touched. However, nothing about his response requires that, for example, the sphere
with which the subject is presented visually is numerically identical, as opposed to merely qualitatively identical,
with which she is presented tangibly.
10Of course, were Locke to consider the case as Leibniz conceives, it is somewhat doubtful that he would accept
Leibniz’s response to that version of the case, due to his rejection of innatism.
11Leibniz’s term. As I use it, a paralytic is a paralyzed person who has no sense of touch.
12The role of the exact ideas of the cube and sphere in Leibniz’s response is left somewhat unclear by the
common sense interpretation. Glenney says that these items ‘avail recognition capability once they are triggered
by the senses.’ See Glenney 2012: 254. However, it is unclear what role this recognition capability ultimately
plays in Leibniz’s response, according to the common sense interpretation.
13Glenney claims: ‘The function of the imagination when dedicated to perception involves the discovery of
commonalities between diﬀerent sensory representations.’ See Glenney 2012: 260.
14It may be that Glenney does not accept this claim. If so, then his interpretation is subject to the same criticism
that raise in this paragraph: the common sense interpretation renders mysterious Leibniz’s appeal to exact ideas in
his response to the problem.
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15While I suspect that the passage from the correspondence with Queen Sophie is an aberration, my argument
against the common sense interpretation does not require this claim. I require only the claim that Leibniz does
not, in his response to the problem, appeal to the ‘common sense’ discussed in the correspondence with Sophie.
That is, I do not necessarily reject the claim that Leibniz could have appealed to the common sense. What I do
reject is the claim that Leibniz did appeal to this notion in his response to the Molyneux problem.
16Glenney does claim to oﬀer an alternative interpretation of the Rational Principles Passage. See Glenney
2012: 261. However, he does not explicitly state what this reading is, and it is not clear to me how he thinks the
common sense interpretation is consistent with the passage.
17It is not clear what, exactly, Leibniz means by a truth’s ‘arising’ from an idea. This notion could perhaps be
understood in terms of conceptual containment or logical entailment.
18For discussion of Leibniz’s rejection of Malebranche’s view that ideas exist not in human minds but rather in
the mind of God, see Jolley 1988.
19Some evidence for this interpretation is also found in the much earlier Meditations on Truth, Knowledge and
Ideas (1684). There, Leibniz speakers of ‘perceiv[ing] ideas’ (L 292; AG 25). This also suggests that Leibniz holds
that ideas are things or items about which we think. See also §26 of the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686) (AG 58).
20Robert McRae (1976) and Larry Jorgensen (2019) each accept an interpretation similar to Jolley’s.
21See, for example, L 207.
22As is discussed below, Leibniz seems to think that, at least with respect to exact ideas, ideas are entirely clear
and entirely distinct.
23Shane Duarte (2009) oﬀers a sophisticated defense of this view, although he does not raise the objections to
the dispositionalist reading that I do here. See Duarte 2009: 713-717.
24Leibnizian ideas should also be distinguished from what Leibniz calls ‘notions.’ Mere notions have content
as of something impossible or contradictory, whereas items of the former sort never do. See AG 56.
25For discussion of Leibnizian concepts, see Puryear 2009.
26Leibniz does not explicitly state the features by which exact or intellectual ideas are distinguished from other
ideas. This is perhaps unsurprising; for Leibniz may to hold that all ideas possess the features he attributes to exact
ideas. That is, Leibniz may hold that all ideas are exact ideas. Duarte 2009 suggests a view of this sort (but see
the note below). Stephen Puryear (2005) seems to reject this view. In what follows, I continue to use ‘exact ideas,’
both because Leibniz himself uses this terminology in his response to the Molyneux problem and because there is
some evidence (discussed below) that Leibniz rejects the claim that all ideas are exact.
27This claim may be inconsistent with Duarte 2009. At some points, Duarte seems to hold only that ideas do
not admit of various degrees of clarity and distinctness. See Duarte 2009: 707. Elsewhere, Duarte seems to accept
the stronger claim that the properties of clarity and distinctness simply do not apply to ideas. See Duarte 2009:
717. I wish to remain neutral here with respect to the weaker claim. The stronger claim seems inconsistent with
Leibniz’s discussion of clarity and distinctness of ideas in the New Essays. See NE 2.29.2; 254-255. For what is
perhaps Duarte’s response, see Duarte 2009: 717.
28As this statement evinces, Descartes deﬁnes distinctness in terms of clarity. While Leibniz, as already noted,
claims to follow Descartes in his understanding of clarity and distinctness, it is not clear that Leibniz follows
Descartes in understanding distinctness in terms of clarity. In presenting Leibniz’s understanding of distinctness
before his understanding of clarity, I do not mean to take an interpretive stand on this issue. Notably, Leibniz
follows Descartes in holding that an idea may be clear without being distinct. SeeNE 2.29.2; 255. This, however,
does not decide the issue of whether he followed Descartes in understanding distinctness in terms of clarity.
29I here gloss over a complication. On one understanding of distinctness, one’s idea of, say, a cube is distinct if
one can distinguish its contents. On another understanding, one’s idea of a cube is distinct if one has distinguished its
contents. Leibniz wavers between these two options, but he seems to more often suggest the latter understanding.
30Leibniz distinguishes between nominal deﬁnitions and real deﬁnitions. Real deﬁnitions, unlike nominal deﬁ-
nitions, establish the possibility of the thing deﬁned. I suspect that Leibniz is concerned in this context with real
deﬁnitions. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this paper, I set this distinction aside.
31In addition to essential properties, propria may be necessary and suﬃcient for an object’s being an instance
of the idea in question. For example, risibility may be necessary and suﬃcient for an object’s being an instance of
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the idea ‘human.’ It is unclear whether Leibniz holds that information with respect to propria is included in exact
ideas.
32As this quote indicates, Leibniz also ascribes the property of clarity to knowledge, not just to ideas. I take him
to intend this understanding of clarity to apply also to ideas.
33I interpret Leibniz’s term ’pure idea’ as being equivalent to ‘exact idea’ and ‘intellectual idea.’ For evidence
that these notions are equivalent, see NE 4.4.5; 392
34I use ‘adventitious’ to mean ‘not innate’ throughout this paper.
35Leibniz holds, unlike Locke, that necessary truths, if in fact necessary, must be grounded in innate ideas. See
NE 1.1.5-11; 80. He appears to hold that the senses could not yield ideas that are suﬃciently distinct so as to
ground necessary truths. See NE 1.1.11; 81
36Leibniz’s view with respect innateness is not straightforward. Jolley 1990 argues that Leibniz oﬀers two ac-
counts of innateness in the New Essays: a dispositional account and a reﬂection-based account. See also Jolley
1988. McRae 1976 attributes to Leibniz a logical account of innateness.
37This understanding of Leibnizian reﬂection is not uncontroversial. Robert Sleigh, for example, seems to
understand reﬂection as ‘brute intuition.’ See Sleigh 1990: 76. But Borcherding’s interpretation seems to me to
clearly ﬁt better with what Leibniz says in the New Essays.
38See, for example, the 1669 ‘The Confession of Nature against the Atheists’ (L 113), the 1678 correspondence
with Countess Elizabeth (AG 235-240), and the 1698 ”On Nature Itself ’ (L 501).
39Given Leibniz’s theory of pre-established harmony—according to which a substance’s perceptual states are a
result of its own activity and not of its entering into genuine causal relations with other substances—images, too,
are fundamentally innate, in a certain sense.
40There is an alternative way in which this passage might be read. Leibniz might be read as saying here only that
we do not, strictly speaking, see the subject of the painting, but that we do see the painting itself. Such a reading
would require that Leibniz’s use of ‘image’ in this passage departs substantially from his typical use of the term.
41Ariew and Garber list this date as questionable.
42Margaret Wilson makes a similar distinction, only between of perceptual and conceptual confusion. See
Wilson 1999: 339. However, Wilson understands perceptual distinctness/confusion and conceptual distinct-
ness/confusion as being diﬀerent in kind. For criticism of Wilson’s distinction, see Puryear 2005: 102-111. My
analysis of Leibniz’s response to the Molyneux problem does not, I think, turn on any particular answer to this
interpretive question.
43It is unclear to me whether Jorgensen would accept this characterization. That he would is perhaps suggested
by his remark that perceptual distinctness and conceptual distinctness are ‘continuous.’ See Jorgensen 2019: 121-
122.
44It has been suggested to me that this passage may not provide evidence for Leibniz’s denying that images
are ideas. Here’s how I understand the passage. Philalethes (Locke) asks, with respect to ‘the smallest atom of
dust [one has] ever saw,’ whether one ‘has any distinct idea…betwixt the 100,000, and the 1,000,000 part of it.’
Leibniz’s response, it appears, is that the images of these two parts is the same, due to ‘how our bodies are now
constituted.’ However, he apparently holds that this fact about the images of these parts is beside the point, for
our ideas of these parts are diﬀerent. So, Leibniz’s claim is that Locke mistakes our images of these parts for our
ideas of these parts, and thus mistakenly attributes a property to the ideas that, in fact, belongs only to the images.
Thus, Leibniz’s point in this passage involves the claim that images ought not be confounded with ideas.
45One claim that perhaps suggests that they are diﬀerent in kind is the claim, noted above, that ideas, and not
images, are composed of deﬁnitions. But this can be understood simply as a way of capturing the diﬀerent degrees
of distinctness that items of each kind possess.
46This proposal coheres well with Leibniz’s Principle of Continuity, according to which, on one reading, any
natural diﬀerence is one of degree. This understanding of the principle is found in Jorgensen 2009 and Jorgensen
2015.
47With respect to, for example, an image of a cube and the exact idea of a cube, I do not mean to claim in this
paragraph that the only respect in which these particular perceptions diﬀer is degree of distinctness; for it seems
that Leibniz holds that they diﬀer in their content, not merely in the distinctness of their content.
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48I introduce here a distinction between visible uniformity and tangible uniformity. Leibniz himself does not
make this distinction. I do not believe that the present interpretation depends upon the legitimacy of this distinc-
tion. The interpretation I present below is consistent with Leibniz’s holding that there is no ultimate diﬀerence
between visual uniformity and tangible uniformity.
49To be sure, it is possible that Leibniz held that the once-blind subject would perform a line of reasoning
diﬀerent from that which I present here. This argument presented below is intended merely as an illustration. As
an anonymous referee helpfully suggests, Leibniz might not hold that the subject’s line of reason would involve
as many disjunctive inferences as that which I present here. My interpretation requires only that Leibniz holds
that the once-blind subject must perform some kind of reasoning, and the argument below is intended merely a
plausible reconstruction.
50The terminology of ‘correspondence’ does not occur in Leibniz’s response to the problem. But Leibniz does
suggest something like this notion when he discusses, in the Geometry Passage, ‘the blind man’s and the paralytic’s’
geometries ‘resting on’ the same ideas. The notion of correspondence might be understood in terms of Leibniz’s
notion of expression. See Kulstad 1977 and Swoyer 1995 for two inﬂuential treatments of Leibniz’s concept of
expression.
51As an anonymous referee points out, if Leibniz does hold that the once-blind subject would perform an
inference like that from (3) and (4) to (5), then his response bears some similarity Judith Jarvis Thomson’s modal
response. See Thomson 1974.
52I understand indirect correspondence roughly as follows: x corresponds indirectly to y just in case there is
no direct correspondence between x and y, but there is some z such that x corresponds to z and y corresponds
to z. As I suggest above, direct correspondence might be understood in terms of Leibniz’s notion of expression:
x corresponds to y just in case x expresses y. Correspondence, I take it, is an intransitive relation. It is unclear
whether expression, for Leibniz, is also intransitive. For an argument that expression is not always transitive, see
Jorgensen 2015: 54.
53This ﬁts well with the text: in his discussion of the problem, Leibniz says very little with respect to the
relationship between visual experience and tactile experience.
54How exactly to understand Leibnizian apperception, and its relation to consciousness, is a matter of interpre-
tive dispute, into which there is not space to enter here. For diﬀerent accounts, see McRae 1976, Kulstad 1991,
Simmons 2001, and Jorgensen 2019.
55The ‘under normal conditions’ clause is inserted to handle the following problem. Unqualiﬁed, this condi-
tional is: if the once-blind subject possesses exact ideas of the cube and the sphere, then the subject could identify
the cube and the sphere. In its unqualiﬁed form, this conditional is false. A counterexample: the subject possesses
exact ideas of the cube and the sphere, but is unable to identify accurately the objects, due to her having a splitting
headache. The ‘under normal conditions’ clause should be understood as: ‘with everything is in place for the
subject’s being able to identify the objects, such that there are no defeaters present for her identifying the objects.’
Importantly, the ‘under normal conditions’ clause does not stipulate that the subject possesses exact ideas of a
cube and a sphere. Leibniz does not seem to recognize, in his argument, that the ‘under normal conditions’ clause
is required. Thus, in what follows, I will leave the clause implicit.
56In the cited passage, Leibniz claims that ‘the whole of arithmetic and of geometry should be regarded as innate’
(emphasis added). Of course, Leibniz may allow that there are abnormal subjects that have some, but not all, exact
ideas of geometry. He at least holds that typical subjects possess innately all exact ideas of geometry.
57Leibniz’s added condition also gives the once-blind subject access to premise (8) of her chain of reasoning: if
vic is an image of the cube, then vis is an image of the sphere.
58Alternatively, the point may be put in terms of justiﬁcation: the possibility described in the above alternative
case threatens the justiﬁcation of the once-blind subject’s conclusion, in the original case, that one object is the
cube and the other object is the sphere. That is, insofar is the subject does not know that the conditions of the
alternative case, rather than the original case, do not obtain, her conclusion lacks justiﬁcation.
59As an anonymous reviewer points out, Leibniz may need to appeal to optical principles in order to block
another skeptical worry, closely related to that discussed above. Consider a familiar case of illusion: a rod half-way
submerged in water looks bent but feels straight. Leibniz would presumably want to hold that one could recognize
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that the tangible image of the rod and the visible image of the rod are images of the same object, and yet the latter
image does not include in its content the property of straightness, while the former image does. Leibniz could
appeal to one’s applying optical principles to the visible image of the rod in order to obtain the result that the
object the image represents is, in fact straight, from which result she could proceed to infer, in the way outlined
above, that it is the same object as the object that feels straight: the rod.
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